Brief notes on traditions of governance in Eastern Europe[1]
by A.Y. Klimenko
These notes are not intended as a catalogue of historic events, only as a brief and accessible summary of major political trends and traditions. To avoid confusion, modern names of countries are preferred over historic names. Considering the examples given below, one may be reminded of the old adage that “history tends to repeat itself”. While repeatability tends to indicate the existence of general properties of these kinds of complex systems, a simpler and more subjective explanation cannot be ruled out: old traditions and aspirations are widely known to modern people and can directly or indirectly motivate their actions.
Traditions of governance in Slavonic lands
The traditional form of governance among ancient Slavs involved two major elements: the knyaz (usually translated as prince), who was a military leader, and the veche (assembly of free people)[2], which played a role in appointing and dismissing the knyaz. The actual roles of the knyaz and the veche varied, but evolved towards three major possibilities:
Democratic: the veche fully controls the selection of the knyaz and/or other elected leaders. This form can be found in the republics of Novgorod, Pskov and Vyatka and, later, among Cossacks in general and in the Ukrainian Hetmanate in particular.
Autocratic: princely or royal power fully dominates or abolishes veche. The best example from this category is the Principality of Moscow, which grew into the Russian Empire.
Aristocratic: the veche dominates the royal power but its membership is restricted only to noblemen. The medieval Kingdom of Poland is a good example of this kind of governance.
While the modern reader expects democracy to be the winner, this often was not the case in the Middle Ages. In fact, historically it has been the democratic forms that appeared to be the more vulnerable. While the democratic tradition has mainly been concerned with self-preservation, autocratic rulers tend to embrace imperial strategies. These strategies do not merely seek to secure benefits at the expense of competitor; they aim for complete destruction of these competitors, and subsequent erasure of competing traditions from the public memory and from all records. In these conditions, any victory of the democratic tradition is always tactical, but any victory of the authoritarian imperial tradition is strategic and, possibly, final. Authoritarian imperialism has the advantage of a cowboy who always shoots first in a duel[3]. While an imperial expansion can be a source of instability, destroying the status quo, it can nevertheless be contained if met with united and determined opposition
While different traditions of governance are often accompanied by differences in ethnic compositions, these characteristics are not necessarily linked to each other. Several different traditions of governance can be supported among a single ethnic group, and multiple ethnic groups can share a single tradition. Allegiance to political traditions should not be confused with ethnic affiliations. Examples of different traditions are given below. In the same way, different political traditions may be represented by different states, or competition of different traditions can take place within a single state.
Moscow Autocracy
The autocratic-imperial tradition is best illustrated by the growth of the small principality of Moscow into the enormous Russian empire. While originally a small town, Moscow gradually increased its power over other Russian principalities due to skilful tactics of Muscovite princes. Initially loyal servants to autocratic tsars of the Golden Horde, the rulers of Moscow managed to increase their autonomy and at the same time ensure tsars’ trust and support in competition with other Russian principalities. Despite the fact that some of these principalities were substantially stronger and larger than Moscow, the princes of Moscow managed to become the Grand Princes and profit from their role in collecting tributes on behalf of the Horde. Moscow grew to take over a number of Russian principalities, eventually subdue the remains of the Golden Horde and continue its conquests into many countries in the East, West, North and South. In this process of aggrandizement, the nature of princely power evolved: while princes of Kievan Rus’ governed on the basis of an agreement with the veche (sometimes real, sometimes forced or nominal), The princes of Moscow demanded and ultimately received from their subjects acknowledgement of their absolute lordship over the growing Muscovite state, similar to absolute supremacy of the rulers of the Golden Horde[4]. This elevation was also accompanied by a gradual introduction of serfdom for the peasants. The princes of Moscow became the tsars of Russia. While Moscow has incorporated some of the principles of governance adopted in the Golden Horde (as well as the Horde territory), the Russian state has not become a country of Eastern tradition, ethnically and culturally. Moscow tends to see itself as the Third Rome (i.e. the great empire that follows the traditions of the Roman Empire and the Tsardom of Byzantium), and embraces the Western style of imperialism. While the rulers of the Horde were tolerant with respect to religious issues, Moscow tsars, like the tsars of Byzantium before them, considered themselves as the protectors of the Orthodox faith.
Coat of
Arms adopted by the Tsardom of Russia: Byzantium eagle serves as a background
for traditional symbolics of the Moscow principality.
The great Russian autocrats (the first Russian tsar Ivan IV the Terrible, the first Russian emperor Peter the Great, and the communist dictator Josef Stalin, to mention a few) are all known for oppressing the population of Russia – irrespective of status and wealth – while rewarding those affiliated with the ruler. For example, Ivan IV introduced an all-powerful and privileged state security service as early as in the 16th century, and enjoyed watching regular tortures and mass executions. While these historic figures might seem paranoid to the modern educated reader, one should not take this to mean they were incapable: Russian autocrats were quite efficient in subduing other nations, enlarging their empires and increasing their influence on the world affairs.
Russia has not always been governed by tyrants, of course, and there were relatively liberal periods in Russian history. As for many other countries, the conflict of different traditions of governance can also be observed within Russian society[5]. Even under the ruthless rule of Ivan the Terrible, the first Russian parliament – Assembly of the Lands – was gathered in the middle of 16th century. In the beginning of the 17th century, Russian society demonstrated its capacity for self-organisation and direct action by the common people --- they were able to repel the Polish invasion and elect a new tsar. Russia also had numerous revolts of Russian Cossacks, although in a more recent history, this social group became a loyal supporter of the state and its emperor.
Republic of Novgorod the Great
From the 11th to the 15th century, Novgorod the Great --- a large and prosperous city located in northern Russia --- used to ring its famous veche bell calling townsfolk to the state assembly (veche). The assembly made decisions with respect to peace and war as well as the other major external and internal affairs of the city. It also appointed princes, other officials and officers, and even the chief ecclesiastic figure -- the Archbishop of Novgorod. Princely regiments in conjunction with numerous Novgorod militia and allies of the city formed the Novgorodian army during war times. The city itself (represented by its veche) and not any of the elected officials was given the title of “Lord” by Novgorodians. Novgorod, which traded with the rest of Europe and was phenomenally rich by medieval standards, had quite a sophisticated society. For example, literacy was widespread between different social groups of Novgorodians. The veche form of governance was the rule, not the exception – in fact, every town or community in the vast Novgorodian lands had its own veche which was subordinate to that of Novgorod. Serfdom was not known in the republic of Novgorod; some peasants even owned their lands.
Traditional
Novgorod Cross shown on the sail of a Novgorodian trade vessel
In the 15th century, Novgorod had to face its greatest challenge – the growing power of the princes of Moscow. While the republic of Novgorod possessed large resources and a substantial military capability, deep divisions became more and more visible in the political landscape of the city. Many prominent Novgorodians did not see the conflicts with Moscow as a major threat to the very existence of their republic and, step by step, the city surrendered its positions. After a prolonged struggle, Novgorod first lost its independence and then, during the next hundred years, suffered from a series of Muscovite raids and persecutions. The veche bell was literally whipped and removed from the city, the Library of Novgorod was razed to the ground, churches and commercial districts were pillaged, and tens of thousands of noblemen and common people were slaughtered in the city and across Novgorod lands. The surviving Novgorodians were dispersed and largely replaced by settlers from Moscow. At the end, Novgorod the Great finally succumbed to its fate and became a small town in the growing Russian empire. While Novgorod’s former glory became a faint echo of the distant past, the republican traditions of Novgorod the Great are remembered and valued by many in Russia, Ukraine and around the world.
The Cossacks and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
One would think that, with the devastation of the northern republics, the old democratic traditions of Eastern Europe would have been lost forever, but in fact they survived against the odds. In the 15th century, new communities that called themselves Cossacks formed at the borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Growing Muscovite state and the remnants of the Golden Horde. Cossacks elected their leaders and officers but, unlike Novgorodians, they never invited princes; instead they selected leaders (atamans) from their own ranks. The Duchy and other states had little control over the Cossack lands. In the time of peace, most Cossacks lived among other Ukrainian people but, in the time of war, they formed an army protecting the country and its population. The Zaporizhian Cossack Host was the main centre of military activity and training, while another large Host was located on the river Don. Being a Cossack was prestigious and there were plenty of new recruits coming from the local population. In fact, anyone (even a serf who had escaped from neighbouring countries) who wanted to have an adventurous and dangerous life could join them. Like Novgorodians before them, Cossacks were tolerant; although, initially, education was not the strongest point of the Cossacks. While being defenders of the Ukrainian population, Cossacks were exceptional warriors, who were seen both as useful allies and as troublemakers by the surrounding states.
Coat of
Arms of the Kingdom of Poland
Ukrainians enjoyed freedom and prosperity in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but after the Duchy joined the Kingdom of Poland to form a commonwealth, the Ukrainian lands became a target for cultural and political assimilation by Poland (Polonisation). The essence of this policy was to mould Ukraine into the social structure of the Polish state including the replacement of Ukrainian language by the Polish language. The main social groups in Polish society were gentry (szlachta), townsfolk, and serfs. The medieval Polish society was aristocratic in its organisation: the szlachta was in control of state affairs and the king. The culture associated with szlachta was sophisticated and attractive to many. Polonisation went smoothly in most of Lithuania (although some noblemen joined the Cossacks instead of the szlachta), but the Cossack lands resisted. The plan was to grant nobility to Cossack officers and the registered fraction of the Cossacks, while converting the rest of the Cossacks into peasants, and turning the peasants into serfs. Some of the officers joined the szlachta, but most of them had a deeper connection to the Cossack community, which had elected them, than to distant Polish noblemen.
The Ukrainian Hetmanate
In the middle of the 17th century, overzealous Polonisation and abuse of power caused a Cossack rebellion which resulted in a brief period of full independence of the Cossack state. The head of state was an elected hetman. Since it would be impossible to preserve its independence, the Cossack state had to seek the protection of its larger neighbours. After considering the options of union with Turkey or union with Russia, the choice was made in favour of a union with Russia. The Cossack state called the Ukrainian Hetmanate existed for more than a hundred years after the union. The Hetmanate enjoyed wide political autonomy that involved the election of the hetman and other Cossack officers, independent financial policy, and a limited autonomy in international affairs. During this period, education and literacy became widespread between all segments of the Hetmanate population while sophisticated culture has emerged and developed. At that time, Ukrainian culture also had a positive effect on education in Russia. The peasantry was free in the Hetmanate, while some of the peasants owned their land through self-governing communities. The Hetmanate was surrounded by regions, which had population and local governance similar to the Hetmanate, but were under direct political control of the empire.
Coat of
Arms of the Cossack Hetmanate
Cossacks’ traditional freedoms were gradually eroded as the autonomy of the Hetmanate was slowly but persistently reduced by the empire. Towards the end of the 18th century, the decline of Poland and its division of between Russia, Austria and Prussia removed any need to tolerate the remaining autonomy of the Cossack state. The policy of Russification of the Hetmanate, which was a mirror image of Polonisation few centuries prior, was promptly introduced and implemented. This policy granted nobility to the Hetman and Cossack officers, abolishing all elections --- this time the officers happily accepted these privileges. The remaining Cossacks were resettled into Russian regions, converted into peasants or fled to the Danube river. The Zaporozhian Host was razed to the ground and its archives confiscated and removed from public access. The rural population of the Hetmanate, which was left without its army and leaders, was eventually converted into serfs. Ukrainian education was scaled down and, in the second half of the 19th century, use of the Ukrainian language was banned. The ban was later relaxed but survived until the collapse of the Russian empire.
Nevertheless, towards the middle of the 19th century the Ukrainian national idea became conceptually connected to the democratic tradition and experienced an intellectual and organisational revival[6]. Ukrainian statehood was re-established during the civil war and its autonomy continued in the USSR. Ukraine declared its independence in 1991.
Summary
In Eastern Europe, the traditional forms of governance among ancient Slavonic tribes evolved into two main traditions, which can be referred to as autocratic-imperial and democratic-national. The goal that is usually targeted by the autocratic-imperial tradition is not only expanding the autocratic state but also extinguishing competing democratic traditions. On many occasions in history, the autocratic-imperial tradition was successful in achieving its goals by applying a combination of political pressure and military action.
Appendix: Historical maps.